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ABSTRACT
The DDoS attack landscape is growing at an unprecedented
pace. Inspired by the recent advances in optical network-
ing, we make a case for optical layer-aware DDoS defense
(O-LAD) in this paper. Our approach leverages the optical
layer to isolate attack traffic rapidly via dynamic reconfig-
uration of (backup) wavelengths using ROADMs—bridging
the gap between (a) evolution of the DDoS attack landscape
and (b) innovations in the optical layer (e.g., reconfigurable
optics). We show that the physical separation of traffic pro-
files allows finer-grained handling of suspicious flows and
offers better performance for benign traffic in the face of an
attack. We present preliminary results modeling throughput
and latency for legitimate flows while scaling the strength
of attacks. We also identify a number of open problems
for the security, optical, and systems communities: model-
ing diverse DDoS attacks (e.g., fixed vs. variable rate, de-
tectable vs. undetectable), building a full-fledged defense
system with optical advancements (e.g., OpenConfig), and
optical layer-aware defenses for a broader class of attacks
(e.g., network reconnaissance).
1. INTRODUCTION
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are on the
rise [1, 9, 17, 39]. The immense attack volumes that saturate
the infrastructure (e.g., transit link flooding), the attack het-
erogeneity (e.g., distinguishable vs. indistinguishable, direct
vs. indirect, etc.), and the low costs to facilitate large-scale
attacks (e.g., attacker-defender cost asymmetry) make DDoS
the most important cybersecurity issue faced by today’s en-
terprises.
Great progress has been made in devising DDoS miti-
gation strategies. Advances in this front range from well-
known techniques such as scrubbing [5, 7, 10, 11, 32] and fil-
tering [8, 15, 26, 48] to the recent routing around congestion
(RAC) technique [42]. Despite these advances, the attack
landscape is continuously evolving and, as a result, creating a
“silver bullet" solution to tackle DDoS has remained beyond
our grasp. For example, Tran et al. [44] recently showed that
RAC-based DDoS defense is infeasible and unusable in an
inter-domain setting. This mandates a rethinking of nature
of the DDoS attacks and calls for new defense strategies.
Meanwhile, the optical community has advanced to the
point where scaling from 100G to 400G—programmatically
and on demand—is possible today [2]. As another exam-
ple, the improvements for amplifier modeling [22] and tun-
ing [46] point towards a rapidly reconfigurable long-haul
backbone in the near future. Lastly, wavelength selec-
tive switches [43] and reconfigurable add-drop multiplexers
(ROADMs) allow wavelengths to change and enable traffic
re-routing on the order of microseconds [38]. While the op-
tical technologies have proven to be of great utility within
networking efforts [38, 41, 14], to the best of our knowledge
it has not received enough attention for cybersecurity issues,
in general, and DDoS defenses, in particular.
We, therefore, believe it is time to introduce “optical layer-
awareness" to effectively combat DDoS attacks. In this pa-
per, we make a case for an optical layer-aware DDoS defense
(O-LAD). The core of O-LAD is based on two key properties
of reconfigurable optics: P1 - physical separation of traffic
within a shared or congested link [6, 33, 49], and P2 - oppor-
tunistic reconfigurability of wavelengths [38, 43]. By lever-
aging these two properties—contrary to Tran et al. [44]—we
posit that RAC-style DDoS defense, while infeasible in an
inter-domain setting, is indeed feasible in an intra-domain,
enterprise setting.
In our preliminary evaluation, we present models for
throughput and latency with O-LAD. Our models separate
traffic into two groups, suspicious and trusted (utilizing
P1), and reconfigures the network topology (with P2). We
demonstrate the efficacy of the models on two types of DDoS
attacks: direct and indirect. For direct attacks, we reroute
the suspicious traffic to a scrubber and send trusted traffic
directly to the destination—improving throughput by 25 to
51%, while reducing latency by 33 to 65%. Similarly, we
show how to apply the two proprieties to reduce attacker de-
tection time by 5 to 10× for indirect (link-flooding) attacks.
While our preliminary results demonstrate the feasibility
of O-LAD, a number of grand challenges remain at the in-
tersection of networking, security and optical communities.
First, apart from the direct vs. indirect DDoS, challenges
lie ahead in modeling and evaluating O-LAD gains for
other types of DDoS attacks including (in)distinguishable,
volume-based, and protocol-conforming attacks. Second, in
addition to DDoS attacks, we posit that O-LAD is applicable
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for a broader class of cybersecurity issues such as network
reconnaissance.
2. WHY CONSIDER OPTICS?
Introducing optical layer awareness to the higher layers of
the protocol stack has a number of key benefits for DDoS
defenses, in particular, and networked systems, in general.
Optical layer can enable new, more powerful DDoS de-
fenses. There are two fundamental properties of optics that
we can leverage to defend DDoS attacks effectively. First,
we can physically separate traffic (P1), e.g., on different col-
ored lambdas of a shared or congested link. This separation
enables us to use optical circuit switches to re-route suspi-
cious traffic to edge-defense appliances such as scrubbers.
Subsequently, we can scrub the suspicious traffic while rout-
ing the trusted traffic directly to the intended destination,
similar to RAC [42]. This way, the trusted traffic benefits
from lower latency. Suspicious traffic, if it is determined to
be benign, benefits from less congestion (as less traffic is
moving through the scrubber). A detailed analysis of this
scenario is presented in § 4.1.
Second is the opportunistic reconfigurability of the opti-
cal layer using the available backup wavelengths in a net-
work (P2). Wavelength-selective switches (WSS) or re-
configurable add-drop multiplexers (ROADMs) allow wave-
lengths to change and re-route traffic on the order of mi-
croseconds [38]. We envision this capability enabling the
next generation of highly dynamic networks. In these fu-
ture generation networks, when attackers target a link with
a link flooding attack (e.g., [30]), a network controller can
quickly identify underutilized, backup, or low-priority wave-
lengths adjacent to the flooded link to allocate new capacity
for trusted traffic on the targeted link. This strategy has the
potential to increase the attack cost radically and protect the
link (and thus the legitimate flows using it) from congestion.
Optical layer awareness can make networked systems
more efficient. First, exposing the optical layer to the net-
worked systems has been shown to help operators prevent
link failures in backbones [40] and design better traffic en-
gineering solutions [18]. Second, free-space optics solutions
have been shown to reduce latency for intra-datacenter trans-
fers [19, 20]. Finally, recent dynamic capacity planning ef-
forts demonstrate the benefits of reconfigurable optical net-
works vs. traditional, statically-provisioned networks [14].
Optical and networking layers are disconnected and
their co-optimization is largely unexplored. Networked
systems depend on the optical layer to support bandwidth-
intensive applications and scenarios (e.g., machine learning,
volumetric DDoS attacks). These systems generally perform
critical functions only at the network layer e.g., to minimize
latency across the network [25, 34] or to reduce the impact
of severe attacks outages [29]. While the recent studies
have looked into joint optimization between the optical and
network layers [14, 27, 40], the area is still largely unex-
plored and, in turn, calls for cross-layer solutions. Industry
trends indicate a growing interest in optics in network man-
agement [16, 31]. We suspect that optical layer management
via higher level control is inevitable, and we look towards
innovation in this front as an enabler for O-LAD.
2.1 Open Challenges
Despite these benefits, leveraging optical layer to defend
DDoS has its own challenges, which we outline below.
Optical layer lacks robust APIs. Networked systems
will require a new interface, and modes of cross-layer com-
munication to enable the next generation of networked ser-
vices. Industry efforts such as OpenConfig [37] are work-
ing to bridge this gap by providing vendor-neutral APIs for
network management. However, without sufficient attention
from the networked systems and optical communities, these
efforts could potentially stagnate. Lack of APIs in the optical
layer is a significant open problem which we do not look into
in this paper. In this work, we assume that programmable
topologies with vendor-neutral APIs exist and explore ways
to leverage that ability to fight DDoS attacks.
3. A CASE FOR OPTICAL LAYER-AWARE
DDOS DEFENSE (O-LAD)
Overview. In this work, we present a case for Optical
Layer-Aware DDoS Defense (O-LAD). The key insight in
O-LAD is to transmit the trusted traffic over a physically
distinct wavelength from suspicious and malicious traffic by
opportunistically reconfiguring low-priority wavelengths or
backup wavelengths, leading to performance benefits for a
victim (i.e., higher throughput and lower latency).
Feasibility. O-LAD is feasible in today’s enterprise net-
works. In what follows, we identify two sources for wave-
lengths that can be leveraged to implement O-LAD but leave
implementation details to future work. First, enterprise net-
works commonly deploy backup wavelengths, e.g., for fault
tolerance and fast fail-over capabilities [35, 45]. Since these
wavelengths are already designated to mitigate link outages,
we see them as suitable sources for additional capacity dur-
ing an attack. Second, wavelengths carrying low-priority
traffic can be re-allocated dynamically, away from their path
and onto the attack path. Sacrificing low priority traffic
during outages is a common theme in traffic engineering
(TE) [21, 24, 28] that we appropriate at the optical layer, thus
allowing more capacity for trusted traffic during an attack.
3.1 Analysis of O-LAD
Definitions. To quantify the benefits of O-LAD we model
the enterprise, where O-LAD will be deployed, as a multi-
graph G = (V,E). In G, V is a set of routers and switches.
E is a multi-set of ordered pairs, i.e., E = {(e, c)}. Let
e be an un-ordered pair of switches, e = {x, y} : x, y ∈
V , which represents a link (wavelength) between switches,
and c ∈ C be the capacity of the wavelength. C =
{1, 10, 25, 40, 80, 100} is the set of capacities available for
wavelengths with today’s commodity transceivers [3].
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Figure 1: Classes of traffic flows (F ) considered by
O-LAD. Attack traffic is shaded in red with diagonal
hatches (A). Benign Traffic is shaded in solid blue.
((S −A) ∪ ¬S).
In our model, flows (F ) are denoted by a source and a des-
tination address (src, dst). We assume that the flows orig-
inate and terminate outside of G, and categorize them into
four subsets. Flows can be Attack (A), Suspicious (S), Not
Suspicious (also known as Trusted) (¬S), and Benign (B).
We use the terms: good, benign, and legitimate interchange-
ably when referring to non-attack traffic. However, B traffic
is not necessarily trusted traffic, ¬S. The four classes are
related as follows (see Figure 1). All flows are either Suspi-
cious or Trusted; S ∪ ¬S = F & S ∩ ¬S = ∅. Attack
traffic is a subset of Suspicious traffic; A ⊆ S. Trusted traf-
fic is a subset of Benign traffic; ¬S ⊆ B. Benign traffic is
(S −A) ∪ ¬S.
3.2 Direct Attacks
In a direct attack, a large number of attackers flood a vic-
tim with traffic such that the victim cannot respond to le-
gitimate users. From an attacker’s standpoint, simple tech-
niques (e.g., reflection and amplification [12, 13]) can in-
crease the strength of direct attacks without requiring addi-
tional resources.
Scrubbing-based defense. In a traditional, scrubbing-
based solution, anomalies in traffic patterns trigger an alarm
when voluminous traffic that is bound for a targeted client
enters the network. After the presence of the attack is known,
the network reroutes all traffic bound for the target through
a fixed set of hardware scrubbing appliances. This rerout-
ing introduces additional latency, and the bandwidth of the
devices themselves adds a fixed limit to the throughput of
traffic for legitimate senders exiting the scrubber.
O-LAD. With O-LAD, we can achieve physical isolation
of traffic, diverting suspicious traffic S through the scrubber
and forwarding ¬S directly to the client, as shown in Fig-
ure 2. We can achieve this by switching ¬S traffic to an
alternate lambda before it can enter the datacenter. Then, a
ROADM can be triggered to route the ¬S wavelength di-
rectly to the destination. Now datacenter only scrubs suspi-
cious traffic.
3.3 Indirect Attacks
In an indirect attack (e.g. Crossfire attack [30]), a coor-
dinated group of attackers sends traffic to each other such
that their communications over the Internet target a specific
backbone link. Such attacks also minimize the throughput
for traffic to the intended target by choosing a critical link
and creating an abnormally high demand for that link.
Spiffy-based defense. Spiffy [29] identifies indirect at-
tackers by a bandwidth scaling operation on congested links.
It utilizes an SDN controller and an optimization framework
to maximize the bandwidth scaling ratio for all links in an
ISP network. The particular topology of the network limits
this ratio. With capacity reserved, Spiffy reroutes a fraction
of traffic from the link under attack via an alternate path.
Then, it monitors the rate-change behavior of flows on the
alternate path to detect malicious senders.
O-LAD. In O-LAD, we propose leveraging idle and re-
configurable (low-priority) wavelengths. This additional ca-
pacity can increase throughput for legitimate senders, and
enable us to identify malicious flows more quickly. Further-
more, O-LAD can decrease latency for trusted flows travers-
ing the link under attack. The latency decreases because we
establish the backup wavelength point-to-point for the link,
rather than rerouting the suspicious flows through the net-
work. When the enterprise detects a link-flooding attack
(e.g., by [47]) it should allocate all suspicious traffic (¬S)
to one wavelength, and the trusted traffic (S) through a dy-
namically provisioned backup wavelength. Then, the enter-
prise can apply the rate-increase monitoring from [29] on the
affected traffic to black-hole traffic from malicious senders
while increasing capacity for trusted senders. In § 4.2, we
analyze the throughput for legitimate senders over time with
O-LAD and with Spiffy, and in § 4.3 we model the expected
latency with Spiffy and compare it with an O-LAD solution.
Figure 2: An O-LAD identifies suspicious (solid) and
non-suspicious (dashed) traffic. Then, physically sepa-
rates both traffic types on distinct optical channels. It
forwards trusted traffic directly to the destination, and
suspicious traffic to the scrubbing datacenter.
4. EARLY PROMISE OF O-LAD
In this section, we present the throughput and latency gains
for legitimate senders under a variety of attack scenarios and
with different mitigation strategies.
4.1 Throughput Gains For Direct Attacks
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Figure 3: (A) Baseline Throughput for Legitimate Senders and Malicious attackers when no defense is deployed. (B)
Throughput for Legitimate Senders when using a 40 Gbps scrubber, with a baseline for reference of improvement. (C)
Throughput for legitimate senders when 40% of good traffic is trusted. The O-LAD line is the sum of the trusted line
and scrubber line below. (D) O-LAD’s throughput when 80% of traffic is trusted.
We model the throughput for a voluminous direct attack
under (i) a baseline scenario where no defense mechanism
is implemented, (ii) when scrubbing is used, and (iii) when
scrubbing is used with O-LAD, as described in § 3.2. We
show that O-LAD increases throughput for legitimate flows
vs. (i) and (ii) during DDoS attacks of varying strength.
Baseline. We analyze the throughput for benign and mali-
cious traffic during a DDoS attack on an enterprise network.
We assume that the victim has a 10 Gbps bandwidth con-
nection. Furthermore, we suppose that when traffic demand
to the target network meets or exceeds the allowed capacity,
all traffic is prioritized equally (the target is incapable of dis-
tinguishing benign or malicious traffic). Finally, we assume
that traffic to the victim has a historical trend of 70% utiliza-
tion. Thus 7 Gbps of traffic is from legitimate senders. Fig-
ure 3 (A) shows that as the volume of the attack increases, the
throughput for real users (goodput), quickly decreases. The
goodput begins to fall as soon as the attacker sends enough
traffic to saturate the network’s bandwidth.
Scrubbing. The state-of-the-art solution for defending
against direct attacks is to forward all flows to the victim
through scrubbing appliances, either on-site at the victim’s
location, or within a carrier network. We model the tar-
get’s traffic as it is re-routed through a scrubbing service
(e.g., [10]). Recall, the victim has 10 Gbps bandwidth and 7
Gbps of traffic is from legitimate users. Suppose scrubbing
service has a fixed capacity of 40 Gbps. We assume that
the scrubber is 100% effective in removing malicious traf-
fic. However, after the attack volume exceeds the scrubber’s
bandwidth, the total throughput for the victim decreases, just
as it did in the baseline scenario. Figure 3 (B) illustrates the
limitation of the scrubbing defense mechanism. After the
attack strength reaches 40 Gbps, services for the legitimate
senders degrades. Note that attack strength required to de-
grade services increases over the baseline scenario. If the
attacker’s goal were to reduce the rate for legitimate sends to
3 Gbps, then the attacker would need to scale the attack from
20 Gbps to 80 Gbps—a 4x increase in cost for the attacker.
Scrubbing + O-LAD. Now, consider the throughput that
the network can forward to the client with O-LAD. We as-
sume that a fixed proportion of legitimate traffic can be
trusted, regardless of the attack strength. For example, if the
historical utilization of the service under attack is 7 Gbps,
then a fraction of the senders who make up 7 Gbps of de-
mand are labeled as trusted. With trusted traffic prioritized,
we can forward it to the victim without involving a scrubber.
Simultaneously, we will deliver all other suspicious traffic to
the scrubber.
Figures 3 (C) and (D) illustrate the throughput for differ-
ent classes of traffic (trusted, and suspicious, malicious, and
total) when 40% or 80% of benign traffic is from trusted
sources. We can see from the figure that goodput of the
network asymptotically approaches the volume of trusted
traffic as the strength of the attack grows. We also notice
that the throughput for data leaving the scrubber approaches
zero as the strength of the attack increases. The goodput of
the network is the sum of trusted traffic and the scrubbers
throughput. We argue that physically separating traffic on
distinct wavelengths, and only sending suspicious traffic to
the scrubber, increases the quality of service for the victim’s
network during a DDoS attack.
Improvements via O-LAD. Considering the three miti-
gation strategies, we see that O-LAD pushes the boundary
further for the strength of DDoS attacks that a network can
tolerate. In Figure 3 we see that when we trust 40% and 80%
of the legitimate traffic, the impact of an attack is reduced
significantly against scrubbing and the baseline. Specifically,
consider a 40 Gbps DDoS attack. In the baseline scenario,
throughput for legitimate traffic fell from 7 to ∼1.5 Gbps.
With the scrubber, throughput fell to 6 Gbps. (Note: that
the scrubber stopped being completely capable of defending
the target when the attack strength was 33 Gbps, as the total
of malicious and legitimate traffic was 40 Gbps). When the
attack strength is 40 Gbps, the total traffic traveling through
the scrubber is 47 Gbps. Therefore performance for legiti-
mate users begins to be impacted. However, if 40% of the
7 Gbps of good traffic never traverses the scrubber, then the
load of the scrubber is reduced by 2.8 Gbps, and the perfor-
mance for good traffic under this 40 Gbps attack only falls
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to ∼6.5 Gbps instead of 6 Gbps. If we route 80% of good
traffic (5.6 Gbps) around the scrubber, then a 40 Gbps attack
has almost no effect on legitimate users.
As the scale of the attack increases, so does the benefit
in providing an optical layer-aware defense. When the at-
tack strength reaches 100 Gbps in the baseline scenario, the
throughput for legitimate senders falls to 0.65 Gbps, ∼9%
of its original strength. The scrubber alone, helped to keep
throughput up to 2.6 Gbps, or ∼37% of the full strength. If
we forward 40% of the legitimate traffic as trusted, the aggre-
gate throughput increases from 2.6 Gbps to 4.4 Gbps, or 62%
7 Gbps—an improvement of 25% percent. Finally, if the net-
work can identify 80% of traffic as trusted, then throughput
for legitimate senders is ∼6.2 Gbps, or 88%—an improve-
ment of 51%. These early results show that O-LAD can help
increase throughput from 25% to 51% over the scrubber in
this scenario.
4.2 Throughput Gains for Link-Flooding At-
tacks
Next, we consider the throughput of our network under
attack from an indirect, link-flooding attack. Suppose that
the target link capacity is 10 Gbps and senders on this link
are guaranteed a 100 Mbps data rate. Further, suppose the
attacker wants to reduce the rate for legitimate senders by
ten-fold. Thus the attacker needs to generate 100 Gbps of at-
tack traffic. According to the optimal attack strategy in [29],
this attacker requires 10 thousand attack flows, sending data
at 10 Mbps each, to reduce the capacity of the link to the
intended level.
The response time for a network to mitigate the link-
flooding attack with Spiffy is a factor of how much extra
capacity can be reserved for fighting link flooding attacks in
the layer-3 topology, Mnetwork [29]. Kang et al., show that
5 to 10 operations of Temporary bandwidth expansion (TBE)
are required to identify 90% of attack flows (based on exper-
iments with ISP topologies; see Figure 15 in [29] for more
details). Also, each of these operations takes ∼5 seconds.
Therefore, we expect that the target link is to be congested
for ∼25 to 50 seconds.
Using O-LAD, the introduction of backup wavelengths
to the network or acquisition of low-priority wavelengths
for defenses could potentially increase Mnetwork to Mideal,
which is the volume of backup capacity required to iden-
tify all bots with one operation of TBE. If these backup
wavelengths are added in the same order of time as a TBE
operation, it is possible to mitigate the attack in ∼5 sec-
onds. We think this is entirely possible, given the inno-
vations in the optical community including programmable
transceivers [2], optical amplifiers for reconfigurable net-
works [22, 46], throughput gains of elastic transceivers in
long-haul networks [23], and recent momentum in the net-
working community [38, 45, 14]. Thus, we implore re-
searchers in the security community to consider optical layer
when designing and modeling the next generation of solu-
tions for DDoS attacks.
4.3 Latency Models and Improvements
Here, we describe the latency improvements with O-LAD,
first describing the baseline latency expectations formally for
(i) no defense, (ii) scrubber-based defense for direct attacks,
and (iii) Spiffy-based defense for indirect attacks. Then we
describe a solution using O-LAD. To start, we consider three
classes of traffic and reason about the expected latency for
each of them with O-LAD for direct DDoS attacks: Trusted
Traffic, (¬S), suspicious traffic from legitimate senders (S−
A), and their union, all good traffic ((S −A) ∪ ¬S).
Baseline. For our baseline analysis of latency, we consider
the metric as the product of the ratio of demand to capacity
and expected a delay when there is no congestion.
LBaseline =
{
δ if T ≤ T c
δ ∗ T/T c ifT > T c (1)
In equation 1, δ is the baseline (propagation) delay through
the network from ingress to the victim, T is the aggregate
demand for all flows F , and T c is the physical capacity of
the congested path or victim. We show the baseline model,
with the fixed capacity, T c, of 10 Gbps, in Figure 4 (A).
Scrubber. To model latency for a scrubber, we introduce
a new additive term, , representing the additional latency in-
curred by traffic through the scrubber in Equation 2. We also
replace the capacity of the client, T c, with the capacity of the
datacenter housing the scrubber, TD. Figure 4 (A) shows the
expected latency when a scrubber is used, assuming that the
baseline latency (δ) is 100 ms, the scrubber-induced delay
() is 100 ms, and the capacity of the datacenter (TD) is 40
Gbps. The slope of the latency curve is determined by the ca-
pacity of the network and the baseline latency (d). Precisely,
it is the derivative of L with respect to T , or (3δ + )/TD.
Thus, a higher capacity implies a lower impact on latency.
In this model, the scrubber can withstand up to TD Gbps
of throughput before performance degrades. This protection
comes at the cost of additional latency for re-routing all flows
to the scrubber. Hence, the Scrubber solution’s latency starts
at 200 ms instead of the baseline 100 ms.
LScrubber =
{
(δ + ) if T ≤ TD
(δ + )(T/TD) if T > TD
(2)
Spiffy. To model latency for Spiffy, we recognize two crit-
ical factors described in [29]. (1) Recall that Spiffy reduces
congestion by expanding bandwidth with reserved supplies
in the network. This factor, MNetwork, is topology depen-
dent. When evaluated on several real-world topologies, the
potential bandwidth scaling factor, MNetwork (or MN ) was
approximately two times the initial capacity (See figure 14
in [29]). Therefore, after twice the initial capacity is ex-
ceeded, latency increases. (2) Spiffy uses alternate paths to
forward traffic and identify attackers. We will refer this fac-
tor as APL, the percentage increase in the alternate path to
the normal path. By [29], APL is expected to be 4 to 24%
longer, so we say APL is 0.04 to 0.24. We augment the
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Figure 4: (A) Latency for legitimate traffic for baseline and scrubbing. (B) Latency for legitimate senders with Spiffy,
where alternate path have an upper-bound additional latency of 24%, and lower bound paths have 4% additional
latency. (C) O-LAD, where 40% and 80% of legitimate users can be identified and routed around congestion.
scrubber’s latency model for Spiffy by substituting  with
δ ∗APL as shown below.
 = δ∗APL =⇒ δ+ = δ+δ∗APL = δ∗(1+APL) (3)
We then substitute TD with MNetwork to obtain
LSpiffy =
{
(δ ∗ (1 +APL)) if T ≤MN
(δ ∗ (1 +APL))(T/MN ) if T > MN
(4)
Figure 4 (B) shows the expected latency for Spiffy [29]
during a link-flooding attack. Latency during low strength
attacks (0 to 14 Gbps) is 104 ms to 124 ms, which is rela-
tively close to the baseline (100 ms). This initial latency is
better than the scrubber’s, which started at 200 ms. After the
attack traffic exceeds the reserved bandwidth, MN , latency
increases.
O-LAD. The benefit of O-LAD is its ability to separate
¬S and S flows, and use the physical separation to route ¬S
around congestion points (scrubbers or flooded links). To
model the latency improvement with O-LAD, we measure
the weighted average of latency for all good traffic (¬S and
S − A). Equation 5 models this latency, using constructions
from § 4.3. We present O-LAD’s latency as L∗O−LAD where
* is either D for direct attacks or I for indirect attacks. In
the case of LDO−LAD we replace Lscrubber with the relevant
latency measure, LSpiffy.
LDO−LAD =
(LBaseline)T
¬S + (LScrubber)TS−A
T¬S + TS−A
(5)
The intuition is that trusted flows (¬S) will have the base-
line latency, and non-attack suspicious flows (S − A) will
have a latency of the defense mechanism, either Spiffy or
Scrubbing. The aggregate measure for latency for O-LAD is
the average of these two values, weighted by the proportion
of traffic in each category.
Figure 4 (C) shows the latency values for varying attack
strengths when 40 and 80% of good traffic can be identified
as trusted. We see that for a 100 Gbps attack, if 40% of the
good traffic is trusted, then latency drops to from 535 ms to
361 ms against the scrubber—a 33% decrease. If 80% of the
good traffic can be trusted, then it falls to 187 ms—a 65%
decrease. These early results show promise for an optics-
based solution for RAC in the face of DDoS attacks.
5. FUTURE OUTLOOK
An approach like O-LAD opens up a number of interest-
ing problems at the intersection of optical, security, and net-
working communities, which we outline below.
On the Feasibility of O-LAD for Diverse DDoS Attacks.
Apart from the direct vs. indirect DDoS, grand challenges
lie ahead in modeling and evaluating the gains of O-LAD for
combating other types of DDoS attacks. In particular, the
feasibility of O-LAD in defending (in)distinguishable, fixed
vs. variable rate, volume-based, and protocol-conforming at-
tacks calls for further research involving optical and security
communities.
Towards a Commercial, Industry-grade O-LAD Sys-
tem. In addition to understanding and evaluating the efficacy
of O-LAD via models, the lack of vendor-agnostic APIs (as
discussed in § 2.1) might impede the further development
of O-LAD into a full-fledged DDoS defense system. This
calls for collaborations among optical, networking and secu-
rity researchers and to create new partnerships e.g. between
OpenConfig [37], enterprises, and security experts to solve
the grand challenges in this front. Furthermore, the hetero-
geneity, scale, and dynamism of modern DDoS attacks re-
quire new testing frameworks and capabilities for O-LAD to
operate effectively against the growing DDoS landscape.
O-LAD for a Broader Class of Cyber Attacks. While
the goal of this paper is to make a case for optical layer-
aware DDoS defense, we believe that the notion of opti-
cal layer awareness is beneficial for a broader class of cy-
ber attacks. First, insider reconnaissance is an on-going
problem since the topology can be mapped as shown by
Achleitner et al. [4]. By keeping the performance and net-
work objectives in mind, we believe O-LAD can arbitrarily
change wavelengths to effectively combat reconnaissance by
providing cyber deception. In addition, complementary to
NetHide [36], we believe that O-LAD can be used to com-
bat targeted attacks by dynamically altering the underlying
wavelengths and, hence, topologies.
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